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All the ideas for 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)', 'A Future for Presentism' and 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson'

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62 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel]
Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel]
Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel]
Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel]
Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel]
Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel]
Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne]
All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel]
Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel]
Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel]
The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne]
Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne]
Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne]
Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne]
B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel]
The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel]
God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel]